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The Tasks of Translatability
Abstract
While Walter Benjamin’s essay “The Task of the Translator” has long been considered one of the
fundamental texts of translation theory, Gramsci’s important remarks on the question of translatability
were not noted in the canonical studies of the history of translation theory nor, for a long time, in
Gramscian studies themselves. Nevertheless, the notion of translatability plays a crucial role in the
general economy of the Prison Notebooks. This paper proposes a dialogical reading ‘against the grain’ of
three constellations of some of Gramsci and Benjamin’s key concepts regarding the nature of translation
and its philosophical presuppositions and implications. These constellations revolve around the
Gramscian notions of hegemony, of translation between ethico-political contexts, and of reciprocal
translatability; they are here read through the Benjaminian notions of translation as generative of the
‘afterlife’ of a literary work, as participating in a ‘pure language’ that functions as translation’s ‘horizon’,
and as constituting an ‘echo’ of the original text in a new linguistic and historical context. The encounter
of Gramsci and Benjamin is not only on their points of clear convergence but also on those points where
they might seem to diverge: this forms the basis for translation and transposition between their
respective thought-worlds – a translation that at the same time represents an attempt to open their works
up to their immanent transformation.
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The Tasks of Translatability1
Peter D. Thomas
1. “Something hasn’t been understood”.
A man who had spent much of his adult life exiled in foreign
lands suddenly found himself confronted with an unexpected
incomprehension at home. In a meeting of speakers of his native
language and a Babelian gathering from around the world, he
realized that he both understood and yet could not understand
what had been said. His confusion arose, however, not from the
intrusion of an unrecognized voice of the other, but from the
uncanny distance of his mother tongue. Speaking during one of his
rare appearances at the Fourth Congress of the Communist
International on the 13th November 1922, Lenin made the
following remarks about the newly minted and much contested
politics of the United Front:
At the Third Congress, in 1921, we adopted a resolution on the
organisational structure of the Communist Parties and on the methods and
content of their activities. The resolution is an excellent one, but it is almost
entirely Russian, that is to say, everything in it is based on Russian conditions.
This is its good point, but it is also its failing. It is its failing because I am sure
that no foreigner can read it […] it is too Russian […] not because it is written
in Russian – it has been excellently translated into all languages – but because
[…] we have not learnt how to present our Russian experience to foreigners [in
such a way that they might be able to] assimilate part of the Russian
experience.2

The problem that Lenin posed for consideration by the
assembled delegates of the self-characterized ‘party of world
revolution’ (unlike in earlier Congresses, now supported by the
services of a professional translation bureau) was clearly not the
problem of translation in a limited sense, as linguistically accurate
1

A previous version of this text was presented at the Internationales Forschungszentrum
Kulturwissenschaften (IFK), Vienna, on 23rd May 2019 as a keynote lecture during the
conference ‘Passagen: Walter Benjamin and Antonio Gramsci’, organized by the Arbeitsgruppe
Kulturwissenschaften / Cultural Studies at the University of Vienna. I am grateful to the
attendees at the lecture and participants in the conference, particularly Ingo Pohn-Lauggas and
Birgit Wagner, for critical remarks and suggestions.
2 Lenin 1965b, pp. 431-2.
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‘reproduction’. Rather, it was what has come to be known more
recently as the broader problem of ‘cultural translation’.3 For Lenin,
the translation of experiences from one cultural context to another
could not be successfully undertaken mechanically or passively,
with the simple re-presentation of meanings derived from the socalled ‘source language’ in the ‘target language’, to use the classic
binary opposition structuring so much reflection on translation,
even today. In the debate over the United Front in which Lenin
was intervening, such a conception of origins and transfers would
simply mean the imposition of the policy by the Russian centre on
its ‘periphery’ in the Western European Communist Parties –
precisely the position against which Lenin had consistently argued.4
Rather, the problem Lenin posed was instead one of understanding
translation as an active process of dialogue, in which ‘meaning’ is
not univocal or constant, but plural and continually changing in
context, retrospectively and prospectively.
As Lenin was well aware, more depended upon the success of
this particular translational praxis than is normally the case, when
the humble translator merely seeks to avoid censure from pedants,
publishers and associated Platonists, and can at most hope to be
rewarded with ‘invisibility’.5 Now the stakes were much higher: the
success of the revolution, not only in Russia, depended upon
finding a way quickly to make comprehensible the slogans, policies
and programmes that had been generated in the long history of
Russian Social Democracy for a Communist movement that was by
now truly global in its linguistic reach.6 It was not only words that
needed to be communicated; even more crucial was the
‘assimilation’ of the ‘experience’ of a successful revolution into the
habits, perspectives and world-views of the international audience
at the Fourth Congress, as prelude to their own practical translation
into the revolutionary politics of their own countries.

3 On the broad notion of cultural translation, see Homi Bhabha 1994; Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak 2007, pp. 263-76; Budick and Iser (eds), 1996.
4 ‘The Equivalential Fallacy’ might be offered as a summary of the errors Lenin detected in
those western European far leftists in the early 1920s who had thought they were presenting
‘faithful’ translations of the militancy of the Russian Revolution while completely misreading
its significance. See Lenin 1965a, pp. 17-118.
5 Lawrence Venuti, 1995.
6 On the development of the ‘relations of translation’ and the shifting relations of linguistic
prestige in the early years of the Third International, see Sergei Chernov 2016, pp. 135-66.
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The translation of the strategic perspective of the United Front
had failed, according to Lenin, not because any particular text
among the many translations of the resolution from the Third
Congress had inadequately conveyed the ‘meaning’ of ‘an original’
that they were supposed merely neutrally to ‘transpose’. Rather, this
translational failure consisted in an inadequacy within the original
itself. ‘The original’ – both the text of the resolution and the
experiences in which it in turn had its ‘origins’ – had not known
how to (re)formulate itself in relation to its now unexpectedly
intimate other. The original formulation of the United Front, that
is, had not known that it would be called upon not simply to speak
for itself, but to carry the conditions of its ‘translatability’ within
itself as constitutive of what it was, rather than a later supplement
or addition.7
2. The Tasks of the Translators
A year before Lenin’s sobering assessment of the failures of the
nascent international communist movement, a still young German
writer was filled with anxiety that his soon to be published foray
into the increasingly crowded field of German versions of
Baudelaire might itself be judged a translational failure. His
response was to write a preface entitled ‘The Task of the
Translator’ [Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers].8
Even though Walter Benjamin had at that time read little Marx
and even less Lenin, it is remarkable how similar his fundamental
orientation to the question of translation was to the Russian
revolutionary leader, despite their many obvious differences. For
both Lenin and Benjamin, the practice of translation should be
understood not as the mere reproduction of the already given, but
as the production of something new in a different context. In
Benjamin’s terms, that stage of the ‘continuing life’ [das Stadium ihres
Fortlebens] of a work of art that witnesses the emergence of its
‘afterlife’ [das Überleben] – the moment in which a work’s
‘translatability’ [Übersetzbarkeit] is affirmed – is no mere repetition of
7

The notion of translatability as constitutive of a text in this sense could thus be seen as
similar to Derrida’s views (extensively thematized in his critique of Searle in particular) regarding the constitutive nature of ‘iterability’ to writing as such. See Jacques Derrida, 1988 [1977].
8 Walter Benjamin, ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, 1980 [1923], pp. 9-21; ‘The Task of the Translator’, 1996, pp. 253-63. On the cultural context in which Benjamin produced his translation
and preface, and particularly his rivalry with Stefan George, see Brodersen, 1996, pp. 109-17.
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an origin, but a retrospective transformation that redefines it. 9
Similarly, for both Lenin and Benjamin, genuine translation is not
the simple transfer of what Benjamin calls an ‘inessential content’
from one place to another, but its transfiguration through temporal
dislocation. It is precisely in this sense that Benjamin insists that a
translation emerges not out of the life of the original itself, but only
from its afterlife [das Überleben] 10 Lenin’s suggestion that overcoming the failed translation of the Russian experiences into
western European tongues would involve a transformation of the
Russian ‘source language’ just as much as the occidental ‘target
languages’ recalls Benjamin’s insistence that translation never
occurs between two fixed entities, but only in the dialectical relation
that both differentiates and simultaneously unifies them in what he
calls a ‘higher and purer atmosphere of language’ [Luftkreis der
Sprache] as such, in ‘the pure language’ [die reine Sprache].11
Again, if translation is a ‘Form’ for Benjamin, a specific form
alongside other similarly specific forms of literary production, for
Lenin translation is conceived as a particular agitational mode, in
terms nevertheless qualitatively continuous with other modes of
socio-political communication.12 Lenin’s concern to understand how
the political knowledge produced in the unrepeatable events leading
up to the Russian Revolution could be ‘assimilated’ rather than
merely derivatively imitated by other communists finds its
Benjaminian correlate in the notion of translation as a search for
the ‘echo of the original’. This echo is not given primordially in the
original, however, but can only be constituted by determination in
the totality of all languages.13 Finally, for both Lenin and Benjamin,
translation in the fullest sense represents the fulfilment of a
promise: the ‘pure language’ that Benjamin sees as both
(retrospectively posited) precondition and consequence of
translation rigorously practised realizes the promise inherent in
9

‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 11; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 254 (translation
modified). I have preferred the processual notion of ‘continuing’ to Zohn’s more static
‘continued life’ to render das Fortleben in order to emphasize the developmental and ongoing
dimension that I take to inform Benjamin’s strategic use of this notion, particularly in its
distinction from ‘afterlife’ [das Überleben], as discussed below.
10 ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 9, p. 10; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 253, p. 254.
11 ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 14, p. 13; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 257 (translation
modified).
12 ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 9; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 254.
13 ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 16; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 258.
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language as material form of human sociality, as unity of diverse
intentions, just as for Lenin the translation of revolutionary
experiences should culminate in the promise of no merely national
or particular revolution, but of world revolution as such.
‘The Task of the Translator’, despite its author’s initial anxiety,
has achieved a phenomenal success. It has been defined by no less
an authority than George Steiner as one of the most innovative
contributions to translation theory not only in the twentieth
century, but in the entire western literary and philosophical
tradition. 14 It has stimulated a wide range of reflections from
Derrida, de Man and Spivak to contemporary theorists such as
Emily Apter and Barbara Cassin. It is an irony that seems both to
affirm and to deny some of Benjamin’s central propositions in ‘The
Task of the Translator’ that the success and extensive influence of
this text has frequently involved heated debates over claimed
‘mistranslations’ of Benjamin’s original ‘words’ and ‘intentions’.15
A similar success has not been enjoyed by the theorization of
translation developed by another writer who was young in the early
1920s. Present in Moscow as a representative of the Communist
Party of Italy, Antonio Gramsci had listened carefully to Lenin’s
words at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International.
They made such a strong impression upon him that he repeatedly
recalled them over ten years later in the texts that have become
known as the Prison Notebooks.16 Among them were four notebooks
14 George Steiner, 1998, p. 283. Steiner lists Benjamin as one of the few to have said ‘anything
fundamental or new about translation’ alongside Seneca, Saint Jerome, Luther, Dryden,
Hölderlin, Novalis, Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Ezra Pound, Valéry, MacKenna, Franz
Rosenzweig and Quine. The bibliography on the reception of Benjamin’s essay in numerous
languages is now immense; Susan Ingram (1997, pp. 207-33) provides a survey of the initial
anglophone debate in her ‘“The Task of the Translator”: Walter Benjamin’s Essay in English, a
Forschungsbericht’, TTR.
15 See, in particular, Steven Rendall (1997, pp. 191-206). The most influential discussion of the
significance of different approaches to translating this text was undoubtedly that stimulated by
Derrida and de Man’s divergent readings; see Derrida, 1985a, pp. 165-207; and de Man (1986),
pp. 73-105.
16 Q7§2, p. 854, November 1930 (PN, Vol. 3, p. 157). Gramsci again recalls Lenin’s remarks at
the beginning of section V of Q11 (Q11§46, p. 1468; FSPN, p. 306), presumably penned in
August 1932. As Peter Ives (2004, pp. 100-101) notes, Gramsci confuses the date of Lenin’s
address to the Fourth Congress in 1922 (which Gramsci himself witnessed) with the Third
Congress of 1921, to which Lenin in his remarks refers. References to Gramsci’s Prison
Notebooks are given according to Valentino Gerratana’s Italian critical edition of the Quaderni del
carcere (Gramsci 1975), following the internationally established standard of notebook number
(Q), number of note (§), and page number. (For English-language translations of the quotations, see under Gramsci in the Bibliography). Dates of individual notes are given according to
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in which Gramsci refined his skills as a translator (particularly from
German to Italian), and a series of notes on the theme of translation and translatability that were revisited, revised and transcribed
primarily between 1930 and 1932, but in some instances extending
also to 1935. These notes eventually assumed a prominent position
in one of Gramsci’s most organically coherent notebooks, Notebook 11, which aimed to provide a new type of introduction to the
study of philosophy. Gramsci’s novel reflections on the philosophical, historical and political significance of translation and particularly his distinctive formulation of the notion of translatability, however, are not noted in any of the now canonical studies on the
history of translation theory. Indeed, it would not be an
exaggeration to say that, until relatively recently, Gramsci simply
didn’t exist in the field of translation studies.17
The situation was admittedly not radically different even in the
field of Gramscian studies for a long period. The theme of
translation and translatability did not play a prominent role in the
first phase of Gramsci’s widespread international reception, in the
1960s and 1970s, when attention to Gramsci’s philosophical,
political and historical insights tended to push a range of other
themes very much into the shade (the neglect of Gramsci’s
contribution to the philosophy of language in this period is a
notable case study). 18 The publication of Valentino Gerratana’s
critical edition of the Prison Notebooks in 1975 did little to change
this state of affairs in a positive sense. In an otherwise scrupulous
attempt to present the Prison Notebooks to contemporary readers just
as Gramsci had written them, Gerratana’s edition in fact excluded
the chronology established in Gianni Francioni (1984) and the revisions contained in the
appendix to Cospito, 2011, pp. 896-904.
17 Gramsci is not discussed in Steiner’s classic study (who does however reference Croce and
Gentile), just as he is absent from most other influential histories of translation theory; see, for
instance, Susan Bassnett-McGuire, 1980; Jean-René Ladmiral, 1994. He is similarly excluded
from major anthologies of texts on theories and histories of translation; see, for instance,
Rainer Schulte and John Biguenet (eds), 1992; and Lawrence Venuti, 2000. Remarkably,
Gramsci’s theory of translatability is not even mentioned in the otherwise comprehensive and
more recent Dictionary of Untranslatables. A Philosophical Lexicon, (Cassin [ed.], 2014 [2004].
18 Among the first studies to emphasize the significance of Gramsci’s university training in
historical linguistics was Franco Lo Piparo (1979). More recent studies, alongside Peter Ives’s
previously cited book, include Giancarlo Schirru’s exhaustive study of Gramsci’s Turin years
(Schirru 2011, pp. 925-73) and the fundamental work of Alessandro Carlucci (Carlucci, 2013).
It is obviously not coincidental that the recovery of Gramsci’s linguistic reflections has
occurred in the same period in which attention has also turned to his thoughts on translation
and translatability.
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the vast majority of Gramsci’s own translations. 19 Although this
omission and its deleterious impact upon our understanding of the
context and significance of Gramsci’s ‘own’ notes was forcefully
highlighted by Lucia Borghese in 1981, it was only in 2007 that
these translations were finally published in full in the new Edizione
nazionale, in the first volumes of the section dedicated to Gramsci’s
carceral production under the editorship of Gianni Francioni.20
In the intervening period, the revival of Gramscian studies
founded upon more rigorous philological and historico-critical principles both in Italy and abroad has redimensioned our understanding of the complexity of the Prison Notebooks and particularly the
‘rhythm’ of thought that traverses them. Thanks to this new season
of studies, we can now see that translation is not merely one among
the many themes explored in the Prison Notebooks. Both the practice
and theory of translation instead play a crucial role in the general
economy of the overall development of Gramsci’s carceral writing
project.21 Above all, the distinctive non-essentialist notion of ‘translatability’ matures during Gramsci’s years in prison into one of the
central methodological innovations of his proposed reformulation
of Marxism as a ‘philosophy of praxis’ and as a ‘living philology’.
3. Philology and Politics between Gramsci and Benjamin
The relationship of Benjamin and Gramsci’s thoughts on translation has already been the subject of a number of significant studies, though admittedly far fewer than those that have explored their
more general affinities in terms of the novel forms of their post19

For a discussion of the reasons for this exclusion, see Valentino Gerratana, ‘Prefazione’, in
Gramsci (1975), pp. xxxvii-viii. Giuseppe Cospito (2011) synthesizes and extends the scholarship that demonstrates why Gerratana’s assessment of the relation between the translations
and the other writings Gramsci composed in prison now needs to be completely revised.
20 Lucia Borghese (1981, pp. 635-65); Antonio Gramsci (2007a).
21 André Tosel’s work, from the same period as Borghese’s, constitutes an important early
exception; see Tosel (1981) Significant early contributions on Gramsci’s concept of
translatability, alongside more recent studies, are collected in Ives and Lacorte (eds), 2010. The
most extended studies of Gramsci’s theory of translatability are the pathbreaking works by
Derek Boothman (2004a, p. 247-66; and 2004b). The relevance of Gramsci to more recent
theories of cultural translation has been highlighted by both by Giorgio Baratta (2007) and
Birgit Wagner (2012). Fabio Frosini places the distinctive notion of translatability at the centre
of the reconstruction of Gramsci’s philosophical thought in Frosini (2010), as well as in
numerous other texts. More recently, among a burgeoning field, see the important
contributions of Martín Cortés (2015); Romain Descendre and Jean-Claude Zancarini (2016);
Giuseppe Cospito (2017, pp. 47-65); Giuliano Guzzone (2018); and Stephen Shapiro and Neil
Lazarus (2018, pp. 1-36).
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humous works, their theories of modernity, their explanations for
the rise of fascism, or their criticisms of the emerging Marxist
orthodoxies of their day.22 In this text, I propose a dialogical reading ‘against the grain’ of three constellations of some of their key
concepts. My aim here is both to explore the tensions and transformations that emerge in the development of their respective
works – in Gramsci’s words, their ‘rhythm of thought’ – and also to
problematize influential understandings of each writer’s theory of
the nature of translation and of its philosophical presuppositions
and implications. These constellations revolve around the Gramscian notions of hegemony, of translation between different ethicopolitical contexts, and of reciprocal translatability. They are here
read through the Benjaminian notions of translation as generative
of the ‘afterlife’ of a literary work, as participating in a ‘pure language’ that functions as translation’s ‘horizon’, and as constituting an
‘echo’ of the original text in a new linguistic and historical context.
First, Gramsci’s research on the translation of political strategies
and techniques from one socio-political formation and historical conjuncture to another – above all, evident in his translation of the Bolshevik notion of gegemoniya into what became his signature concept
of egemonia – is here read in relation to Benjamin’s reflections on the
‘afterlife’ of a text as the affirmation of its constitutive translatability.
Second, the historicist theory of the potential for translation
between different national and linguistic cultures developed in the
Prison Notebooks is viewed through the lens of Benjamin’s theory of
the ‘pure language’ towards which translation strives, the horizon of
the totality of the relations of all languages that translation alone
can produce.
Third, Gramsci’s development of a non-essentialist theory of the
reciprocal translatability of discourses, conceived not simply as
systems of signification but as conflicting or reinforcing forms of
socio-political organization and action, is used to rethink
22 Studies dedicated specifically to a comparison between Gramsci and Benjamin’s theorisation
of translation include André Tosel (1996, pp. 55-66); Peter Ives (2004, pp. 97-133); and most
recently, the important study of Saša Hrnjez (2019, pp. 40-71). I also recall here the IGSsponsored conference held in Naples in 2003, ‘Dialoghi del carcere: Gramsci incontra
Benjamin’, at which the sadly departed Giorgio Baratta and Domenico Jervolino presented
significant papers. The more general comparative study of Gramsci and Benjamin has been
explored by a number of authors, though rarely in great textual detail; Daniel Bensaïd’s oeuvre
represents a significant exception, as do the other articles collected in this issue of the
International Gramsci Journal.
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Benjamin’s notion of the ‘echo’ of the original in translation in nonfoundational terms.
In each case, it is the encounter of Gramsci and Benjamin not
only on their points of clear convergence, but even more signifycantly, on those points where they might seem to diverge, that
forms the basis for translation and transposition between their
respective thought-worlds – a translation that at the same time
represents an attempt to open their works up to their immanent
transformation.
4. The ‘Afterlife’ of Hegemony
While the early international reception of Gramsci’s work,
particularly in the anglophone New Left, sometimes erroneously
regarded hegemony as a concept of Gramsci’s own coinage, more
recent studies have focused upon the multiple sources that were
synthesized in the Prison Notebooks in this now widely influential
political word. What has perhaps been less noted are the complex
politics of translation that mark the history of hegemony, from its
elaboration in a variety of historical, political and philosophical
contexts in ancient Greece, its descent into ‘untranslatability’ for
well over a millennia, to its revival in the classical inheritances of
early nineteenth century European nationalisms and later transposition and development in early Russian Social Democracy.23
Relations of translation are also central to Gramsci’s own usage
of the word, both before and during imprisonment. Gramsci’s
precarceral activism as party leader can in large part be regarded as
an extended ‘translational mediation’ on the significance of the
debates about hegemony and its relation to the politics of the
United Front that he had encountered amongst the Bolshevik
leaders during his period in Moscow in 1922-3. That this translation
was not simply an imitative transposition of a word from East to
West is evident by the significant historical, formal, methodological
and conceptual innovations that Gramsci introduced to the concept
of hegemony, particularly in the Prison Notebooks.

23

On the development of hegemony among the classical Greek historians, see John
Wickersham (1994). For the most comprehensive surveys of the conceptual history of
hegemony, see Bruno Bongiovanni and Luigi Bonanate (1993, pp. 470-77); Giuseppe Cospito
(2016, pp. 49-88); Derek Boothman (2008, pp. 201-15), which analyses the multiple currents
that flowed into Gramsci’s thinking about hegemony.
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Historically, Gramsci extends the range of the concept, from
early twentieth century Russia back to eighteenth and nineteenth
century Western Europe. Formally, the concept of hegemony had
functioned in the debates of Russian social democracy as the
advocacy of the emergence of a qualitatively different form of
political relationality, outside the institutional structures of an
exclusionary absolutism; in Gramsci’s translation, it is instead often
used to analyse social formations (France, Italy, and so forth)
defined by the consolidation of the principle of popular sovereignty
and its simultaneous practical neutralization, by means of the
passive inclusion of popular political forces in an established
bourgeois hegemonic project; ‘passive revolution’ is the term that
Gramsci gradually comes to propose for this translation of
hegemony into the context of the bourgeois politics of the modern
parliamentary state and its transmogrification under Fascism. 24
Methodologically, Gramsci translates hegemony from the register
of the political programme, where hegemony functions both
strategically and prefiguratively, to that of historico-political
analysis, in which the concept operates as description and critique.
The decisively new addition that Gramsci made to the range of
meanings of hegemony, however, consisted in his translation of it
into the ‘political language’ of the Italian debate in the 1920s on the
nature of political authority, particularly in terms of the relation
between ‘force and consent’. It was a debate that occurred on numerous fronts, but which was, in conceptual terms, particularly refracted through the lens of the contemporary discussion of Machiavelli.25 The theme of a dialectical tension between ‘force and consent’ constitutes one of the ways (but by no means the only way) in
which Gramsci theorizes hegemony in the Prison Notebooks. This
couplet has no precise counterpart in the Bolshevik discussions
from which Gramsci drew his initial inspiration. In the Russian
debate, hegemony was primarily used to theorize the specific difficulties of political, social and cultural leadership and mobilization
24

I have elsewhere analysed the gradual emergence of the notion of ‘passive revolution’ in the
Prison Notebooks in relation to the concepts of hegemony and particularly ‘the revolution in
permanence’. See Peter D. Thomas 2020, pp. 117-46).
25 The notion of a ‘political language’ is used here in the sense developed particularly in Pocock
(1989). Regarding the debate on force and consent in Italy in the 1920s, particularly in relation
to contemporary Machiavelli scholarship and commentary, see Leonardo Paggi (1970, pp. 372
et sqq.); Michele Fiorillo in Giasi (ed. 2008, pp. 839-59); Fabio Frosini (2013, pp. 545-89).
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(among allied subaltern classes), while themes of coercion (exercised over non-allied classes) were discussed in terms of the related
but distinct notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat.26 Nevertheless, such has been the success of this particular translation that
some later interpreters have taken the couplet of force and consent
to constitute a ‘hard core’ of the notion of hegemony itself, not
only in Gramsci or the Russian context, but throughout its entire
long journey from ancient Greece to contemporary critical theory.27
Gramsci’s various translations of hegemony can be understood
as a particularly pointed demonstration of Benjamin’s notion that
the translatability of a text is only confirmed in its ‘afterlife’ [das
Überleben]. This afterlife does indeed emerge at a particular moment
of a text’s ‘continuing life’ [das Fortleben], but is qualitatively distinct
from it. A translation for Benjamin may seem to issue ‘from the
original’ (itself never identical to itself, because always transformed
by its continuing life even before it is translated); but as he immediately adds, the translation emerges ‘not so much from [the original’s] life as from its afterlife’. 28 Contra an influential tradition of
interpretation that sees Benjamin’s argument here as uncertainly
caught between a Platonism of origins and a messianism of ends,
translation in ‘The Task of the Translator’ is not depicted as the
result of the ‘survival’ of an originary translatability; it is not merely
a ‘living on’ of what was already there in potential. 29 On the con26

Craig Brandist (2015) provides an exhaustive account of the importance of hegemony in
Russian Social Democracy, both before and particularly after the revolution.
27 Perry Anderson’s reconstruction of the history of hegemony in The H-Word (Anderson,
2017) is entirely based upon this anachronistic projection of a theme from the 1920s (refracted
through a particular reading of the Prison Notebooks that was affirmed in the early 1960s, and
remains today one of the most influential understandings of the nature of hegemony) back
onto periods in which the word hegemony was deployed on the basis of very different
coordinates and presuppositions. It leads him to neglect significant variations in hegemony’s
semantic field in Ancient Greece (particularly in ethical discourses), in pre-Risorgimento Italy
(Gioberti is entirely absent from his history) and in post-Revolutionary Russia (particularly in
Lenin’s last writings on cultural revolution).
28 ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 10; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 254. For Benjamin’s
claim of the original’s transformation through time, see p. 12; p. 256. Zohn’s translation does
not maintain the distinction between fortleben and überleben, sometimes using afterlife to render
them both. Compare, for instance, the text of his translation with Benjamin’s own words
regarding the relation of the original, its continuing life, stage of fame and translation: p. 11; p.
255.
29 Derrida’s emphasis upon the notion of translation as a ‘sur-vival’ – in effect, collapsing the
distinct meanings that I am arguing Benjamin ascribed to fortleben and überleben – leads him to
think translation in terms of ‘living on’, inheritance, and ultimately a mourning for the loss of
origins; as Derrida once revealingly remarked, in translation ‘one always has to postulate an
original’, even if it is only to deny its authenticity (Derrida, 1985b, p. 147). See also, in addition
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trary, while for Benjamin a translation occurs during the continuing
life of a text and marks a decisive stage of its development (what he
refers to as its ‘fame’ [Ruhm]), its ‘afterlife’, conceived as a distinct
mode of its existence in discontinuity with its ‘pre-translated’ state,
is itself only concretely realized in the achieved fact of a translation.
It is this achievement that retrospectively redefines a text’s origins
and determines the very translatability [Übersetzbarkeit] of what only
now can be seen as ‘the original’.30
The translatability of hegemony did not derive from some
mythical quality that was already ‘there’ in the ‘original’ Greek word,
and which its subsequent translations have only more or less
adequately approximated without ever exactly reproducing. It was
rather the history of its reception and interpretation that
retrospectively reordered the field of its visibility and determined its
capacity to speak differently in different historical epochs.
Gramsci’s translations of hegemony and their influence on
subsequent understandings of its history and meaning provide an
almost paradigmatic case study of the fact that a word is not born
translatable, but only becomes so. The becoming translatable of a
word is ultimately determined not by the force of its origins but by
the history of the effects that a word’s resonance in different
contexts generate as the traces of its always excessive afterlife.
to ‘Des Tours du Babel’ (Derrida 1985a), both ‘Living On’ and ‘Border Lines’, in Bloom (1979
[1978]). One of the most penetrating accounts of Derrida’s notion of translation is Kathleen
Davis (2001); see in particular her discussion of Derrida’s reading of Benjamin on pp. 40-46).
Derrida’s notion of the simultaneously totally translatable and totally untranslatable arises from
this (often implicit) postulation, one he shares with many contemporary theorists of the
untranslatable. A similar conflation is at work in de Man’s reading, which closely associates
Überleben with the notion of late maturation [Nachreife]; see his ‘Conclusion: On Walter
Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator”’, p. 85. In the cases of both Derrida and de Man,
Benjamin’s sometimes organic metaphors lead them to overlook the extent to which the
notion of afterlife represents not the ‘original’ text’s temporal continuity (even in a sublated
sense), but instead the rupture of its retrospective and dialectical reconfiguration.
30 It is in this sense that I read Benjamin’s argument that a translation ‘comes later than the
original’ and that translatability is ‘immanent’ [innewohnt] to the original (p. 10; p. 254,
translation modified) not in terms of the temporal priority accorded by the mimetic theoretical
tradition to the original (translation as derivative imitation), but in terms of retrospective
reconfiguration. In translational praxis, a previously singular instance is redefined by its
insertion into a manifestly constructed ‘causal’ sequence; an ‘original’ only becomes such at the
moment of its supposed repetition in translation, before which it was simply indeterminate
even in relation to itself. This is not a question of how translation ‘modifies the original’, as
Derrida suggests (1985b, p. 122), because prior to translation there was no ‘original’ text at all
in this sense. It is rather the problem of how the original text is constituted as an origin only in
the process of translation. For an important discussion of the complexity of Benjamin’s
relation to the mimetic tradition, see Andrew Benjamin (1989).
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5. The ‘Ursprache’ of ‘Pure Language’
Gramsci’s research regarding an historicist theory of the
possibility of translation between different cultures can be regarded
as a theoretical generalization of the impulse behind his expansive
practical translations of hegemony. Here Gramsci’s privileged
reference was The Holy Family, where Marx, following upon a theme
in Kant, Hegel and Heine,31 argues that the political language of the
French revolution (particularly what Gramsci glosses as ‘Jacobin
phraseology’) ‘corresponds to’ and ‘can be translated into’ the
language of classical German philosophy.32 In an early version of
this argument, Gramsci argues, following Marx, that ‘the formulae
of French politics of the revolution can be reduced [si riducono] to
the principles of classical German philosophy’, in a relationship of
distillation. 33 How could such a translation between two distinct
linguistic and cultural registers be possible?
In a significant line of research, particularly in notebooks 4 and 8
but also in notebooks 11 and 15,34 Gramsci seems to argue that
such a translation could occur because different cultural and linguistic expressions are fundamentally only different ways of comprehending similar, if not the same, socio-political and cultural experiences, diversely expressed in different languages and genres due to
different national traditions and institutions. In other words, French
politics and German philosophy – and, Gramsci soon adds, following Engels and Lenin, English political economy – would be translatable because they represent particular forms of comprehension and
expression of a more general if not universal experience, namely,
the uneven emergence of political modernity in each of those social
formations. For such a perspective, linguistic or cultural diversity
seems to be grounded in the commonality or commensurability of a

31

Gramsci discusses the lineage at length in Q8§208, p. 1066-7, (PN Vol. 3, pp. 355-6)
February-March 1932, adding to the traditional German line of inheritance the Italian
Carducci.
32The reference to the Jacobins occurs in Q1§44, p. 51 (PN Vol. 1, p. 148), February-March
1930; the reverberations of the historical experience of Jacobinism, both in France and
internationally, remains a constant concern throughout the Prison Notebooks. The notion of a
‘correspondence’ between languages is formulated both in Q1§44 and, not for the last time, in
Q4§42, p. 467 (PN Vol. 2, p. 191), October 1930.
33 Q3§48, p. 331 (PN Vol. 2, p. 51), June-July 1930.
34 See in particular Q15§64, p. 1828-9 (FSPN, pp. 314-5), June-July 1933, in which Gramsci
uses the comparison of revolutionary France and philosophical Germany as a model for
comprehending the relations between Greece and Rome.
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seemingly ‘pre-linguistic’ experience.35 Gramsci will even resort, in
early 1932, to traditional metaphors of the Marxist tradition, arguing that ‘two structures have equivalent and reciprocally translatable
superstructures’.36 He explains this position in more extended terms
several months later, in the Summer of 1932. He argues that
translatability presupposes that a given phase of civilization has a
‘fundamentally’ identical cultural expression, even if the language is historically
different, determined by the particular tradition of each national culture and
each philosophical system, by the predominance of an intellectual or practical
activity etc. Thus we should see if translatability is possible between
expressions of different phases of civilization, insofar as these phases are
moments of development from one to the other, and are thus mutually
integrated, or if a given expression can be translated with terms of a previous
phase of the same civilization, a previous phase, however, which is more
comprehensible than the given language etc.37

Translatability in this version seems to be determined by the
existence of a fundamental identity or even ‘universalism’ (within
certain geopolitical limits) underlying and informing different
cultures and languages, which are grasped as merely
epiphenomenal, or superstructural elements that comprehend a
phenomenal if not noumenal base. Translation in this perspective
would thus appear to be premised on a detour via the generic, or a
commonality of shared historical experience.
Even more intriguing are the claims that frame and supplement
this argument. Gramsci had begun this note by asking ‘if the
reciprocal translatability of various philosophical and scientific
languages is a “critical” element that belongs to every conception of
the world, or only to the philosophy of praxis (in an organic way)
and only partially able to be appropriated by other philosophies’.
He concludes by stating that ‘it thus seems that one can say that
35

Derek Boothman (2004a) explores the complexity of this dimension of Gramsci’s theory not
only in comparison to dominant theories of translation, but particularly in relation to major
‘realist’ paradigms of philosophy and history of science in the twentieth century. Fabio Frosini
(2010) formulates Gramsci’s notion of the linguistic diversity that underwrites the possibility of
translation in terms that draw upon similar presuppositions: ‘languages say the same thing in
different ways; or better, they can say the same thing because they are different. There is thus a
difference that not only does not impede, but rather is that which makes identity possible’ (p.
31); ‘the different national traditions need to be deciphered as different forms of response to
historical problems … fundamentally identical’ (p. 176).
36 Q8§208, p. 1066-7 (PN, Vol. 3, p. 356) , February-March 1932.
37 Q11§47, p. 1468 (FSPN, p. 307), August-December 1932.
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only in the philosophy of praxis is “translation” organic and
profound, while from other points of view it is often a simple game
of generic “schematisms”’.38 Read quickly, and in a way contrary to
Gramsci’s arguments elsewhere, it might seem that with this
formulation Gramsci is suggesting that Marxism has a privileged
access to a ‘grammar’ of universal history. 39 It would be on the
basis of activating this grammar, almost as a decoding machine, that
translation between different particular languages or cultural
paradigms would become possible. In other words, Marxism – and,
seemingly, particularly Gramsci’s version of it as a philosophy of
praxis – would be represented as a metanarrative, within which
other narratives can be integrated and subsequently deciphered.
With such an emphasis upon a foundational paradigm, there
might seem here to be some similarities to Benjamin’s conception
that translation involves access to a ‘pure language’ [reine Sprache], or
as he also puts it in in continuity with other themes in his thought
from the early 1920s such as ‘true politics’, a ‘true language’ [wahre
Sprache]. 40 Steiner provides a representative example of this
interpretation. For him, Benjamin’s ‘pure language’ should be
understood as that which ‘precedes and underlies’ other languages.
He characterizes it as a ‘universal language’ or ‘origin’ to which the
translation, in its derivative role, seeks to ‘return’, a ‘common
source’ of all languages. Steiner even goes so far as to characterize
Benjamin’s ‘pure language’ explicitly as an ‘Ur-sprache’. 41 It is a
reading that is effectively in continuity with some of the previously
discussed interpretations of Benjamin’s theory of translation that
emphasize, with whatever qualifications, the importance of
determining an origin for the translational process.
What such a reading neglects is the ‘regulative’ rather the
founding force of pure language for Benjamin. The pure language
does not subsist in the ‘life’ or even ‘continuing life’ of a text, but
always by definition exceeds it. A glimpse of such a pure language –
38

Ibid.
‘Contrary to his insights elsewhere’, because Gramsci was a consistently fierce critic of the
type of abstract universalism embodied in the enthusiasm for Esperanto in his time, including
in the socialist movement. See Q3§76, p. 353 (PN Vol. 2, p. 73), August 1930; Q11§45, p. 1467
(FSPN, p. 304), August-December 1932; Q23§39, p. 2235 (SCW, p. 268), from July-August
1934.
40 Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 13; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 257. On the Kantian
dimensions of the notion of ‘true politics’, see Massimiliano Tomba (2006).
41 Steiner, After Babel, p. 66-7.
39
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and only a glimpse – is given by a text’s ‘afterlife’, or in other
words, from that – fleeting and unrepeatable – moment when its
translatability is affirmed in the concrete praxis of translation. The
afterlife of a text cannot be predetermined, or even predicted,
before this moment; it does not organically emerge from the continuing life of the text, but represents a radical rupture of such a
teleological temporal continuum. In a similar way, the pure language that Benjamin posits in relation to translatability can only ever
be determined retrospectively in the achieved unity of the relations
of languages that are constructed actively in the various ‘forms’ of
translation inherent in and constitutive of all modes of intentional
communication, but particularly intensely in the specific ‘form’ of
literary (especially poetic) translation.42 Rather than a return to origins, what Benjamin’s pure language instead offers in my view is an
ultimately ‘regulative’ instance (in a Kantian sense) that constitutivly could not be confirmed empirically in past or future. It represents
an unreachable limit that orients the endless differentiation of
translation rather than an end state in which identity is finally
affirmed. It is, to modify one of Derrida’s formulations inspired in
part by Benjamin, a type of ‘weak messianic power’ without messianism, which refers not to origins or ends, but to the non-teleological purposiveness implicit in all forms of historical practice.43
In a structurally similar way, the relations of ‘correspondence’
between Jacobinism and classical German idealism may have later
appeared to the critical tradition that Gramsci inherited and
extended to be premised upon a ‘“fundamentally” identical cultural
expression’. But this was not an equivalence simply given in a
civilizational structure, waiting to be comprehended by more or less
adequate interpreters. Rather, it was the active equation of these
two significant ethico-political movements operated by this critical
tradition itself that had enabled those distinct historical experiences
42

Benjamin defines this ‘pure language’ as ‘the totality of [all individual languages’] intentions
supplementing one another’, and further, as ‘the harmony of all the various ways of thinking’
[die Harmonie all jener Arten des Meinens]. ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 14; ‘The Task of the
Translator’, p. 257 (translation modified). While Zohn’s rendition of ‘all the various ways of
meaning’ in this context has the advantage of preserving Benjamin’s juxtaposition between
meinen and ‘what is meant’ [das Gemeinte] (elsewhere Zohn uses the vocabulary of intentionality),
I have preferred to render it with the more generic ‘way of thinking’ in order to emphasize the
processual nature of Benjamin’s argument, and to avoid the confusion of this generic process
with any particular content or significance (for Benjamin, Sinn, which Zohn also sometimes
renders in English as ‘meaning’).
43 An important immanent critique of Derrida’s notion can be found in Sami Khatib (2013).
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‘to correspond’ in retrospect, that is, in the communicational rather
than identitarian sense of correspondence. The conditions for the
affirmation of their reciprocal translatability were, in other words,
not given in their origins; they were instead constructed politically
in the ongoing translational process that is the history of the
relations between them.
6. The ‘Echo’ of Origins
Gramsci’s development of a distinctive notion of what he comes
to call reciprocal translatability can be regarded as an attempt to
explain, without falling into a ‘schematism’ of origins, primacy or
goals, why it is only within the philosophy of praxis that translation
can be ‘organic and profound’. The notion of a reciprocity of
translatability had already been introduced as a problematizing
qualification in Gramsci’s earliest notes in which translation was
formulated in terms of ‘“reduction”’ (tellingly, itself problematized
by Gramsci’s habit of the critical use of quotation marks).44 The
theme of reciprocity increases in importance throughout the Prison
Notebooks, assuming a central role of conceptual clarification in
Gramsci’s late revisions to some of his earliest notes. In one of his
final notebooks, for instance, the metaphor of a ‘reduction’
between France and Germany is abandoned, and he speaks instead,
following Hegel, of the ‘parallel and reciprocally translatable
juridical-political language of the Jacobins and the concepts of
classical German philosophy’.45 Rather the conceiving translation in
terms of foundational and secondary moments, this model instead
explores translatability in terms of the primacy of the relation over
the related terms, or in other words, in terms of a non-essentialist
and post-foundationalist dialectical relationship.46
As so often in the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci’s engagement with
Croce was decisive for these conceptual developments. Croce had
famously theorized the impossibility of translation, of literary works
and poetry in particular, because it ‘diminishes’ or ‘despoils’ the
44

On Gramsci distinctive ‘philology of the quotation mark’, see Dario Ragazzini’s important
study (Ragazzini 2002 p. 17). The use of this critical technique is notable in Q3§48, p. 331 (PN
Vol. 2, p. 51), June-July 1930, where Gramsci initially spoke of a ‘reciprocal “reduction”, so to
speak’, in a type of double problematization (graphically and idiomatically).
45 Q19§24, p. 2028 (SPN, p.78), July-August 1934-February 1935. Q19§24 is a revision of the
previously cited Q1§44.
46 The relation of Gramsci’s notions of translation and translatability to the dialectical tradition
is creatively explored in Hrnjez’s, ‘Traducibilità, Dialettica, Contraddizione’ (Hrnjez 2019).
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original. 47 Croce’s is a familiar Platonic gesture that depicts
translation as yet another mimetic failure to transport the veracity
and intensity of an origin into what are assumed to be its merely
derivative copies. Translation for Croce must always fail (at least as
far as aesthetic works are concerned) because the original work is
posited to be, in its essence, a singular and unrepeatable fusion of
intuition and expression; an exact replication of any such moment
is by definition impossible. As Croce’s former comrade in arms and
later antagonist, Giovanni Gentile, had noted, this position at its
limit makes the unity of the historical process inconceivable, for it
negates the possibility of ‘translation’, or coherent transition, even
from one historical moment to the next.48
Gramsci’s quite different response to the presuppositions of
Croce’s line of reasoning is as brief as it is brutal: conceived in these
identitarian terms, a ‘perfect’ translation may not be possible, he admits, before asking: but ‘what language is exactly translatable into
another language? What single word is exactly translatable into another language?’.49 As Gramsci recognized, Croce’s notion of the
impossibility of translation is based upon at least two dubious presuppositions. First, it presupposes that translation, strictly conceived,
should involve the mimetic reproduction of a pure original, or in
other words, that translation should involve the (re)production of
identity. It is as if translation ideally should involve a complete and
total transfer of both content and form, almost as if it would empty
out the original but only in order for the original to ‘re-present’
itself in the ‘copy’ as its immutable self, in a journey that changes
nothing. Second, the thesis of the impossibility of translation, despite
its claims, in fact presupposes the theoretical possibility of such
identity or equivalence, in order then to deny that this theoretical
possibility is ever realized in any particular act of translation. Each
empirical, particular act of translation is thereby measured against
an absent universal possibility and found wanting. In other words,
although there may regularly occur more or less successful acts of
47

Benedetto Croce (1992 [1902], p. 76.).
On the nexus of intuition-expression, see Benedetto Croce (1921, pp. 53-72, particularly p.
66). Gentile’s attempt to think translation as a metaphor for the way in which the unity of
spirit is secured against the Heraclitan flux of historical change can be found in Giovanni
Gentile (1920, particularly pp. 372-3). On the debate between Croce and Gentile, considered in
relation to Gramsci’s notion of translatability, see the important contribution of Domenico
Jervolino, ‘Croce, Gentile and Gramsci on Translation’ (Jervolino, 2010, pp. 29-38).
49 Q11§48, p. 1470 (FSPN, p. 309), August-December 1932.
48
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translation – success being determined differently in each case –
translation as such, in its supposedly ‘pure’ form, never happens.
It is precisely such a ‘pure’ conception of translation, however,
that Gramsci’s development of the notion of reciprocal
translatability puts in question. In its concrete historical reality, the
practice of translation is never a pure transmission of an origin;
were it pure in this sense, in a relation of identical, immediate and
exhaustive re-presentation, there would be no need for translation
in any sense at all, because it would always already have occurred in
the origin’s identity with itself. Translation always and necessarily
begins in media res, overdetermined by broader existing relations of
force between cultures, languages, genres, and so forth. It is the
constitutive unevenness of these relations of force which establish
the possibility or – what is the same thing – the need to translate in
the first place. The notion of parallel and reciprocal translatability
emphasizes the multi-directionality of this relation, as both socalled ‘source language’ and purported ‘target language’ are
translated and retranslated into each other, without the privileging
of any foundational instance.50
Reciprocal translation can be ‘organic and profound’ in the philosophy of praxis alone not because it represents a metanarrative of
human history, or the type of Ursprache to which Benjamin’s ‘pure
language’ has often wrongly been reduced. Rather, the organic and
profound translations effected by the philosophy of praxis are
based upon the fact that its emphasis upon the practical constitution even and especially of thought annuls the metaphysical claim
to a qualitative distinction between supposedly universal and purportedly particular discourses. It historically situates each of them
as decisive elements in the organization of the socio-political realities that do not precede them, and which they therefore do not
merely express after the fact, but which they literally constitute
through their relations.51 The relationship between theory and practice in this perspective is not to be conceived as application of the
50 The notion of reciprocal translatability in this sense represents a concretization of Gramsci’s
allusive metaphor of an ‘homogenous circle’ in relations between discourses. See, for instance,
Q4§46, p. 472 (PN Vol. 2, p. 196), October-November 1930, later revised in Q11§65, p. 1492
(SPN, p. 403), August-December 1932. For a careful analysis of the significance of this line of
research, see Derek Boothman (2004b, p. 74 et sqq.).
51 I have explored this dimension of the philosophy of praxis, particularly in Gramsci’s critique
of the metaphysical limits of Croce’s idealist historicism, in Peter D. Thomas (2009, Chapter
Seven).
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former to the latter, but as the mutual and on-going translatability
between discourses that depend upon each other to be that which
they are, in a differential rather than identitarian relation. Translation becomes here not the successful or deficient imitation of an
origin, but instead a mode of intervention into the practical reality
of the relations of translatability between discourses that already
constitute the possibility and reality of each and any discourse.
I would suggest that Benjamin’s notion of the transformative
‘echo’ of the original in the translation should be read in such a
dialectical optic, even as his metaphors in this text may seem to
struggle to overcome the reliance of much translation theory in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries upon an ultimately Platonic
rhetoric of origins. Just as ‘pure language’ for Benjamin neither
precedes any particular language or text but emerges only as a
horizon, fleetingly, in the practice of translation, so this ‘echo’ is
not a repetition of something that was there in ‘the original’ itself.
This echo is neither a return to a plenitude of origins, nor revelation
of its destitution.52 It is produced only in the relation between texts,
a relation that does not and cannot pre-exist the practice of
translation, as the concrete mode of their relating. Thus, when
Benjamin writes that the task of the translator ‘consists in finding
that specific intention toward the language into which one is
translating that awakens in that language the echo of the original’,
the notion of an echo functions to indicate the difference that
translation retrospectively inserts into the original itself, which now
cannot be thought except via its ‘reverberation’ in translation. 53
This echo does not re-present the meaning [Sinn] of the original,
but re-activates and extends its ‘way of thinking’ [Art des Meinens] in
52 Romain Descendre and Jean-Claude Zancarini, ‘De la traduction à la traductibilité’
(Descendre and Zancarini 2016), see Benjamin’s notion of an echo as a return to origins in a
foundational-temporal sense, while De Man effectively understands it a revelation of the
essentially disarticulated nature of the original itself (the pure form of language as such, bereft
of the ‘illusion of meaning’). See ‘Conclusion: On Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the
Translator”’ (de Man, 1984, p. 84).
53 ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 16; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 258. Benjamin’s notion
of an echo comprehended in this sense bears comparison to T. S. Eliot’s almost contemporaneous formulation of the notion of an ‘objective correlative’ as a ‘formula’ or ‘a set of objects,
a situation, a chain of events’ that is capable of ‘re-evoking’ a particular emotion in poetry, or
more precisely, of ‘re-evoking’ ‘normal’, non-poetic emotion in the type of emo-tional
response distinctive to poetic sensibility. As with Benjamin’s echo, this re-evocation in fact
constitutes an entirely new experience – an experience proper to the poetic – that is not a
reproduction of its supposed forerunner, but which reacts back upon it, redefining its immediacy in relation to the mediation of the poetic. See T. S. Eliot (1921, p. 92).
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an entirely different context.54 It thereby reorders the possibility of
meaning and thinking in both ‘source’ and ‘target’ languages, in a
dialectic of reciprocal transformation.
7. Living Philology
It is in the combination of perspectives from these three constellations – retrospective reconfiguration, politically constructed
correspondence, and reciprocal translatability – that there emerges
the distinctive features of Gramsci’s reformulation of the Marxist
tradition: the study of ‘definite and precise “individualities”’, 55
undertaken not speculatively, but by means of ‘“active and conscious co-participation”’ and ‘“compassionality”’, ‘through a system
that one could call “living philology”’. 56 It is this focus on the
‘experience of immediate particulars’, and the non-hierarchical
relations of reciprocal translatability that they can establish between
themselves without subsumption to a universal instance, Gramsci
argues, that represents the fundamental methodological innovation
introduced by the philosophy of praxis.
A similar orientation towards the relations of singular
experiences traverses Benjamin’s work in its various phases and
significant internal differences. It finds one of its most eloquent
formulations in a letter to Adorno from the late 1930s, in terms
remarkably similar to those of Gramsci’s notion of a ‘living
philology’ as not only an historical method, but also as a political
intervention. Benjamin here seems to expand the task that he had
assigned to the translator in the early 1920s – of liberating a text
from the weight of the past embodied in its ‘continuing life’ by
endowing it with a qualitatively new afterlife oriented to the
horizon of the pure language – into a general historical-materialist
method for ‘redeeming’ [ambivalently positioned between erlösen
and einlösen] the past from its imprisonment by and within the
present.57 ‘The appearance of self-contained facticity that emanates
from philological study and casts its spell on the scholar is dispelled
according to the degree to which the object is constructed in
54

‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 18; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 260 (translation
modified).
55 Q7§6, p. 856 (PN Vol. 3, p. 159), November 1930.
56 Q11§25, p. 1429 (SPN p. 429), July-August 1932.
57 For an attempt to read (particularly the late) Benjamin’s theologically inflected Erlöung in the
profane terms of Einlösung, promise and possibility, see W. Hamacher (2005, pp. 38-68).
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historical perspective. The lines of perspective in this conclusion,
receding to the vanishing point, converge in our own historical
experience. In this way, the object is constituted as a monad. In the
monad, the textual detail which was frozen in a mythical rigidity
comes alive’.58
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